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Abstract:
The tension between universalism and cultural relativism lies at the heart of war crimes
and war crimes prosecutions. While cultural relativism arguments should never be the
basis for ignoring war crimes outside of the West (particularly in Africa), neither should
the international community adopt a radical universalist approach that ignores the
unique circumstances underlying each war crimes prosecution. The establishment of the
ICTR, over the objection of the post-genocide Rwandan government, probably erred on
the side of universalism by ignoring the legitimate needs of the Rwandan people.
Nevertheless, the ICTR has appropriately adopted a “mild” cultural relativist approach
in its proceedings, by considering cultural differences when evaluating witness testimony,
interpreting the definition of certain crimes within the context of the Rwandan
experience, and considering Rwandan sentencing practices when sentencing defendants.
Future international tribunals should learn from the ICTR experience and consider
cultural differences as necessary to do justice in the communities they are designed to
serve.
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“While academic debates about the possibility of objective
truth and falsehood are often rarified to the point of
absurdity, Rwanda demonstrated that the question is a
matter of life and death.”1
I.

Introduction
The creation of several new international war crimes tribunals over the past

fifteen years raises a host of legal and policy issues concerning the way these tribunals
seek to do justice. Arguably one of the most important issues is the role, if any, that
cultural differences should play in the establishment and operation of these tribunals.
This issue is important because the long-run legitimacy of the tribunals will depend on
their acceptance by both the communities in which they seek to do justice as well as the
larger international community. This dual acceptance, in turn, will largely depend on the
ability of these courts to recognize and take into account cultural differences that may
affect their ability to uncover the truth, while also ensuring that people from all
backgrounds are equally protected from (or held accountable for) the crimes under their
jurisdiction.
There are easily recognizable truths on both sides of the debate. On the one hand,
if the international community has universally condemned a particular crime, why should
cultural differences play any role in how an international tribunal investigates and
prosecutes that crime? On the other hand, how can international judges seek to
adjudicate the guilt or innocence of individuals from a culture that is not their own, while
also attempting to combine different legal cultures and receive evidence in a language
that they do not speak, without recognizing and taking these differences into account?
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Part II of this article explores this dilemma in general terms. First, I give a brief
summary of the debate between universalism and cultural relativism in the field of
international human rights. I then argue that cultural relativism issues lie at the heart of
war crimes and war crimes prosecutions. The very definition of “war crimes” is affected
by cultural relativism, and relativism is often a subtext in debates about whether war
crimes should be addressed by international, domestic, or hybrid courts. Moreover, even
within the context of an international criminal tribunal, there is a need for cultural
sensitivity in the way that tribunal seeks to do justice.
Part III of this article applies these general observations to the establishment and
operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR” or “Tribunal”).
First, I set out the facts leading up the Rwandan genocide and the establishment of the
ICTR, with an eye toward the role that the international community played in these
events. I then ask whether the establishment of the tribunal was reflective of a harmful
“one size fits all” attitude in the international community, or if it was a necessary step in
order to accord justice equally in Africa as in Europe. I also explore select decisions of
the ICTR with an eye toward whether, and how, these decisions were influenced by real
or perceived cultural distinctions between the international judges and the persons before
them. I specifically focus on: (1) cultural factors that affect witness testimony; (2) the
question of applying the international law of genocide in the Rwandan context; and (3)
the role of culture in sentencing at the ICTR.
In Part IV, I conclude that future international tribunals can learn a great deal
from the ICTR experience. I argue generally that sensitivity to cultural differences will
assist international tribunals to be more effective in war crimes prosecutions, but that the
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international community must also be careful not to allow actual or perceived cultural
differences to become an excuse to disregard or minimize war crimes. I specifically
argue that international tribunals should follow the lead of the ICTR in its willingness to
recognize and take into account cultural differences as they arise. I also argue that hybrid
tribunals have a better chance of striking the proper balance in this respect. Finally, I
argue that any international or hybrid tribunal should exercise jurisdiction only when the
domestic courts are unable or unwilling to do so. In this way, I advocate a “mild”
cultural relativism approach to international war crimes prosecutions.
II.

The Cultural Relativism Debate and its Application to War Crimes and War
Crimes Prosecutions

A. The Universalism-Cultural Relativism Debate
One of the major ongoing debates in the field of international human rights is
between the opposing views of universalism and cultural relativism. Put most starkly, the
debate is between (1) those who believe that “[h]uman rights are, literally, the rights that
one has simply because one is a human being,”2 regardless of an individual’s location,
culture, or background; and (2) those who maintain that at least some rights vary
depending upon the culture to which a person belongs.
According to Professor Jack Donnelly, a Western political scientist, this debate is
better understood as points along a continuum rather than as a choice between two
extremes. At one end of the spectrum, “radical” cultural relativism holds that culture is
the only source of the validity of a human right or rule.3 On the other end of the
spectrum, radical universalism holds that culture is completely irrelevant to the validity
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of these rights and rules.4 Between these two extremes lies a continuum of views ranging
from “strong” to “weak” cultural relativism.5 Strong cultural relativists would argue that
culture is the principal source of the validity of a right or rule, but would nevertheless
accept the universal validity and application of a few basic rights. Weak cultural
relativists (strong universalists) would presume the universality of most rights and rules,
but would hold that culture may also be an important source of the validity of others.6
In addition, one element of confusion that runs through this debate is that there
are two different “faces,” or aspects, to cultural relativism, one generally positive and the
other negative. On the positive side, cultural relativism evolved largely as a reaction to
the evils of colonialism: given the fact that “African, Asian, and Muslim (as well as Latin
American) leaders and citizens have vivid, sometimes personal, recollections of their
sufferings under colonial masters,” there is an understandable sensitivity to external
pressure.7 In addition, cultural relativism may be seen as a rejection of the West’s “moral
imperialism,” or “the rush to judge another person’s flaws without revealing or
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recognizing one’s own.”8 Finally, as a practical matter, human rights activists are likely
to be more effective if they ground their advocacy in local cultural norms.9
In its negative face, however, cultural relativism arguments are often used as an
excuse to avoid responsibility for human rights violations. Thus regime elites often make
cultural relativism arguments in an “attempt to deflect attention from their [own]
repressive policies.”10 A related problem is that, although the community and the state are
different entities, cultural relativism arguments sometimes “assume unjustifiably an
identity between government objectives and cultural values.”11 “[P]articularly in states
that lack democratic institutions, the crude cultural relativists’ identification of the state –
and its objectives – with the cultural values of its people remains dubious.”12
Another, slightly more subtle version of the “negative face” of cultural relativism
is that of the international community ignoring or excusing human rights abuses that are
occurring in a particular state. This may take the form of well-meaning Westerners,
8

BERTA ESPERANZA HERNÁNDEZ-TRUYOL ET AL., MORAL IMPERIALISM: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 8-9
(2002); see also DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 99 (noting that U.S. President Clinton expressed great
indignation at the prospect of an American teenager being publicly caned in Singapore, without “find[ing]
it even notable that in his own country people are being fried in the electric chair.”); see also Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Na‘im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to Defining International Standards of Human
Rights, in ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 38 (1992)
(“[I]t is extremely important to be sensitive to the dangers of cultural imperialism, whether it is a product of
colonialism, a tool of international economic exploitation and political subjugation, or simply a product of
extreme ethnocentricity. Since we would not accept others imposing their moral standards on us, we
should not impose our own moral standards on them.”).
9
See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Reflections on Liberal Individualism, in AN-NA‘IM, supra note 8, at 155
(“Often appeal to local shared understandings [in denouncing practices such as torture, slavery, and
genocide] has the practical advantage of touching a government or political movement more deeply than an
appeal to international standards [which] can be portrayed as alien and invasive, especially to collective
autonomy.”); see also An-Na‘im, supra, note 8, at 20 (“[S]ince people are more likely to observe normative
propositions if they believe them to be sanctioned by their own cultural traditions, observance of human
rights standards can be improved through the enhancement of the cultural legitimacy of those standards.”).
10
DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 100.
11
Robert D. Sloane, Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International
Human Rights, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 527, 586 (2001). For example, it has been argued that “in the
Rwandan genocide of 1994, it was not culture per se, but a political elite’s manipulation and exacerbation
of preexisting socio-cultural divisions within Rwandan society that caused the systematic slaughter of
Tutsi.” Id. at 587.
12
Id. at 587.
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aware of the largely negative legacy of Western colonialism, failing to criticize
arguments advanced by non-Westerners “even when [those arguments] are inaccurate or
morally absurd.”13 Or it may take the more vicious form of neglect or outright
xenophobia, with an underlying attitude of “they’ve always been that way, why should
we make any effort to change things now?”14
The anti-relativist, or universalist, stance is also strengthened by recognizing that
relativist arguments are sometimes put forward by those cultures who would seem to
need their protective value the least.15 For example, in the past the United States
sometimes adopted a cultural relativist approach with regard to the juvenile death
penalty, a practice widely recognized to be in violation of customary international law.16
Finally, Professor Donnelly argues with some force that in developing countries today,
rather than “the persistence of traditional culture in the face of modern institutions . . . we
usually see instead a disruptive and incomplete westernization, cultural confusion, or the
enthusiastic embrace of ‘modern’ practices and values. In other words, the traditional
culture advanced to justify cultural relativism far too often no longer exists.”17
13

DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 100.
Cf. GOUREVITCH, supra note 1, at 284 (criticizing Western commentators who, observing the serious
post-colonial problems in Zaire, “took cynical solace in the conviction that this state of affairs was about as
authentic as Africa gets. Leave the natives to their own devices, the thinking went, and – Voilà! – Zaire. It
was almost as if we wanted Zaire to be the Heart of Darkness; perhaps the nation suited our understanding
of the natural order of nations.”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Roadmap: Is the Marketplace Theory for
Eradicating Discrimination a Blind Alley?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 215, 238-39 (1998) (discussing “norm
theory” and social science studies that demonstrate that “[w]e respond to persons in need according to how
normal or abnormal their plight seems to us. Thus, famines in Biafra evoke little response because we think
they are normal in that part of the world.”).
15
See DONNELLY, supra note 2, at 99.
16
See Universalism, Relativism, and Private Enforcement of Customary International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 311, 315 (2004). In fact, the Supreme Court recently held that the juvenile death penalty is
unconstitutional, in part because of the “stark reality that the United States is the only country in the world
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.” Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183,
1198 (2005).
17
Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 410 (reprinted in
DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW POLICY, AND PROCESS 216 (3D ED.
2001)).
14

6

B. Application of the Debate to War Crimes and War Crimes Prosecutions
1. Cultural Relativism and War Crimes
As in other areas of human rights, cultural relativism issues lie at the heart of war
crimes and war crimes prosecutions. With respect to the crimes themselves, most
scholars, including relativists, seem to agree that there are at least a small, core set of
prohibitions that are universal.18 “Few today, for example, would resort to cultural
relativism to defend cultural practices that sanction slavery, human sacrifice, or
genocide.”19 Beyond this sense of agreement as to a small subset of crimes, however, the
specifics of what acts are universally prohibited, and when, is seldom articulated.20
In fact, one commentator, David Chuter,21 has pointed out that there “there are
few, if any, war crimes . . . that were not at some time regarded as permissible, if not
actually praiseworthy, in various civilizations.”22 Moreover, Chuter argues that

18

See, e.g. MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE xi (2002); see also id.
at 66; Henry J. Richardson III, Book Review: Imperatives of Culture and Race for Understanding Human
Rights Law: Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique by Makau Mutua, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 511,
514-15, 517 (2004).
19
Sloane, supra note 11, at 583; see also David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J.
INT’L L. 85, 126 n.145 (2004) (“[E]ven those inclined to embrace relativist positions on human rights never
press their relativism to the point of overtly defending genocide or crimes against humanity.”)
20
See, e.g., An-Na‘im, supra note 8, at 21 (“[D]espite their apparent peculiarities and diversity, human
beings and societies share certain fundamental interests, concerns, qualities, traits, and values that can be
identified and articulated as the framework for a common ‘culture’ of universal human rights. It would be
premature in this exploratory essay to attempt to identify and articulate these interests, concerns, and so
on, with certainty.”) (emphasis added); Donald W. Shriver, Jr. 16 J.L. & RELIGION 1,5 (2001) (arguing that
there is an “emerging international consensus on the nature of ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity,’”
but also noting that “[w]e are still in the midst of an international struggle to specify these categories [and]
to give them legal definition . . . .”); MUTUA, supra note 18, at xi (“There are aspects of the official human
rights corpus that I think are universal. Prohibitions against genocide, slavery, and other basic
abominations violate humanity at the core. But beyond these obvious points of agreement, the ground
becomes tricky.”) (emphasis added).
21
Chuter works for the British Ministry of Defense, where he has had responsibility for Balkans war crimes
issues and support to the ICTY. See DAVID CHUTER, WAR CRIMES: CONFRONTING ATROCITY IN THE
MODERN WORLD 299 (2003).
22
Id. at 10 (citing Deuteronomy 20:12-18); see also id. at 17 (“Killings, wife-stealing (the basic story in
Homer’s Iliad), cattle-rustling, and the spoiling of crops were among the staples of intergroup relationships
in earlier times, and there was no sense that any of these acts was wrong, provided it was directed at a
member of the out-group. Indeed, most heroic poetry (see Homer) praises deeds that today would be
thought illegal as well as immoral.”).
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“international criminal justice [today] has a heavily Western, white, Anglo-Saxon
character,” and that its “vocabulary and concepts are not neutral [but instead] are
culturally specific, constructed and manipulated by a very small number of countries,
most of which have English as their native or second language.”23 Chuter therefore
concludes that international humanitarian law does not embody universal values, but
rather “is in part a form of neocolonialism, in the sense that it gives the West practical
leverage to achieve political objectives such as the replacement of rulers or regimes.”24
Even the term “war crimes” is problematic. In this paper, I use the term generally
to refer to all of the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of international criminal
tribunals, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. As such, it is
useful shorthand, but it can also be confusing and deceptive, and inevitably means
different things in different contexts.25 In fact, “each successive international court has
tended to define the categories of war crimes and crimes against humanity with new
components or variations . . . .”26
Moreover, the crimes that do fall under this broad umbrella are international
crimes only because of the context in which they take place. In other words, rape is rape,
and murder is murder, but sometimes they are violations of international law and
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Id. at 94. Chuter specifically argues that international humanitarian norms reflect Western biases in their
focus on individual guilt, imputation of command responsibility, and demand that soldiers disobey
unlawful orders. Id. at 96-97. Chuter also notes that “[n]one of the major players in the international
humanitarian law game can dictate to others from a position of complete moral superiority: all have done
things comparable to some of the atrocities of Rwanda and Yugoslavia in modern times, or they have
excused similar behavior on the part of their allies. Likewise, all have blocked, or attempted to block,
investigations by international authorities into their own conduct more recently.” Id. at 95.
24
Id. at 95.
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See id. at 3 (noting that the expression ‘war crimes’ “needs to be used with great care. Neither the
[ICTY] nor the [ICTR] tribunals punish war crimes – they punish serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Confusingly, the Statute of the [ICC] does refer to war crimes, but in a context that is
describing what was called Violations of the Laws or Customs of War or Grave Breaches of the Geneva
Conventions in the past. It is a mistake to assume that war crimes are a conceptual category all their own.”)
26
Patricia M. Wald, Reflections on Judging: At Home and Abroad, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 219, 235 (2004).
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sometimes not. In general, it depends on whether they take place during an “armed
conflict” or in a situation where the violence is “widespread and systematic” in nature: all
inquires that are somewhat subjective.27 Finally, within the context of an armed conflict,
it is typically the character of the victim as a civilian or other non-combatant that makes a
certain act a crime, and there is often “a degree of subjectivity” in the definitions of
combatants and non-combatants.28
Thus several levels of contextual nuance surround the definition of war crimes –
all of which will be impacted by the cultural viewpoints of, inter alia, the victims,
perpetrators, judges, and others who create and interpret international humanitarian law.
It is therefore unsurprising that cultural relativism arguments also play a large role in
determining the appropriate response to war crimes when they occur, particularly the
response by the international community.
2. Cultural Relativism and Responses to War Crimes
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community and particularly the
United Nations has begun to respond more and more often to the occurrence of war
crimes throughout the world. In many cases, that international response has taken the

27

See, e.g., CHUTER, supra note 21, at 77-78 (“violations of the laws or customs of war, as well as grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, require an armed conflict of some kind if they are to be charged. . . .
[The ICTY’s] statute requires it to prove the existence of an armed conflict first before crimes against
humanity can be charged. (This stipulation is not found in the statute for the [ICTR] or in the ICC
Statute.)”); id. at 214-15 (the requirement of an armed conflict “has been dropped in the ICC Statute . . .
[b]ut the other requirement for the proof of crimes against humanity is that the atrocities should be
‘widespread and systematic,’ which is to say that random atrocities, even conduced on a large scale and
very brutally, would not qualify unless there were an underlying plan of some kind.”); see also Richard H.
Pildes, Conflicts Between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of Legalism, 44 VA. J.
INT’L L. 145, 160 (2003) (“[J]udging individual acts of criminal responsibility always presupposes some
normative context, but in many cases involving alleged war crimes, it is that very context that is the subject
of dispute. As soon as the law tries to assess that larger historical and political context, the law moves into
areas of indeterminacy and political conflict.”).
28
For example, “[a]ny troops sent into Rwanda in 1994 to ‘stop the genocide’ would have found
themselves firing on women and children, who made up a substantial proportion of the Hutu killers.”
CHUTER, supra note 21, at 78.
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form of the establishment of an international legal tribunal. First, in 1993 the United
Nations Security Council created the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in response to atrocities in the Balkans during the various conflicts
in that region.29 Then in 1994, the Security Council created the ICTR in response to the
Rwandan genocide of that same year.30 In addition, several “hybrid” courts, combining
national and international judges and law, have also been established or discussed – most
notably in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia.31 Finally, the long-awaited
International Criminal Court (ICC), the first ever permanent, treaty based international
criminal court, was established in July 1998, and the Rome Statute governing the
jurisdiction and functioning of the court entered into force in July 2002.32
Yet if “[l]aw is a form of cultural expression and is not readily transplantable
from one culture to another,”33 then the creation of international criminal tribunals will
necessarily have implications for the cultural relativism debate. The concept of

29

See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 28, U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1994), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/098/21/IMG/N9309821.pdf?OpenElement (deciding in
principle to establish the tribunal); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 29, U.N. Doc S/INF/49 (1994),
available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/306/28/IMG/N9330628.pdf?OpenElement
(adopting the Statute of the tribunal); see also 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 30-31 (1998); Ivana Nizich, International Law
Weekend Proceedings: International Tribunals and Their Ability to Provide Adequate Justice: Lessons
from the Yugoslav Tribunal, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 353, 353 (2001).
30
See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50 (1996), available at
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/140/97/PDF/N9514097.pdf?OpenElement; see also 1
MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 72; Nizich, supra note 29, at 353.
31
See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Accountability for War Crimes: What Roles for National, International and
Hybrid Tribunals?, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 192, 192 (2004); Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization
of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 55 (2003); Laura
A. Dickinson, The Relationship Between Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo, 37
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1059. 1059, 1070-71 (2003); Laura A. Dickerson, The Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 296-300 (2003).
32
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998),
available in 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002); see also International Criminal Court, About
the Court, at http://www.icc-cpi.int/about.html.
33
MARY ANN GLENDON, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 10 (1982); see also
Note, Kristina D. Rutledge, “Spoiling Everything” – But for Whom? Rules of Evidence and International
Criminal Proceedings, 16 REGENT U.L. REV. 151 (2004).
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“universal” jurisdiction over war crimes is largely accepted and “there is a remarkable
degree of consensus among international lawyers in favor of international criminal
accountability for mass murderers, rapists, and torturers.”34 There is also, however, a
healthy body of scholarship that argues that purely “outsider” prosecution is a flawed
response to war crimes.
For example, in critiquing the international community’s response to the
Rwandan genocide, including the establishment of the ICTR, Professor Jose Alvarez has
argued that “the international community needs to be responsive to the idiosyncratic
conditions that gave rise to massive violations of human rights as well as to the
conditions prevailing in those societies in the immediate wake of atrocities.” 35 Professor
Alvarez asserts that his critique “is not premised on cultural relativism”36; however, he
does admit that there may be “idiosyncratic cultural or historical reasons why Rwandans
or other groups may resist solutions designed or imposed by the international
community,” and he agrees that some of those reasons are suggested by his analysis.37
Similarly, in an analysis of the effectiveness of both the ICTR and the ICTY,
Ivana Nizich, a former intelligence analyst and research officer for the ICTY, has opined
that “[t]he international community cannot have an elitist, paternalistic attitude toward
[war] crimes and toward the victims of these crimes, i.e., viewing local participation as
inherently biased, tribal, inexperienced, and inept.”38 Nizich also argues that “hybrid
attempt[s] to fuse international and national participation in adjudicating war crimes may,
34

Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 366
(1999).
35
See id. at 370 (emphasis added). The Rwandan situation and the ICTR are discussed in greater detail in
Part III, infra.
36
See id. at 369.
37
Id.
38
Nizich, supra note 29, at 364.
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in some cases, be preferable [to] the ‘elitist’ models (i.e., the ICTY and ICTR).”39 Again,
though not specifically using the language of cultural relativism, the subtext to this
argument is that the hybrid tribunals will better understand and reflect cultural values and
be less prone to the moral imperialism dangers of a radical universalist approach.
Finally, Professor Mark Drumbl has argued that “although all genocides are
among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,”
nevertheless, “each genocide is unique . . . [and] the modalities of securing accountability
and encouraging healing should vary in each individual case.”40 Professor Drumbl thus
argues that policy responses to war crimes should be based on a “contextual approach”
rather than a “deontological approach . . . [that] posits that trials of selected individuals
(preferably undertaken at the international level) constitute the favored and often
exclusive remedy to respond to all situations of genocide and crimes against humanity.”41
Although he hesitates to specifically invoke the language of cultural relativism,42
Professor Drumbl clearly embraces at least some aspects of the theory, arguing that
“[p]rocesses based on local culture and regional practice may create a greater sense of
familiarity among victims than the potentially alienating procedure of trials.”43 Thus the

39

Id. at 363. I return to the advantages of hybrid tribunals in Part IV, infra.
Mark Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1221, 1224 (2000); see also Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The
Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 548 (2005) (“[I]nterpretations of justice are often
multi-layered and, for many people, take root in national and local contexts.”)
41
Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 40, at 1228.
42
See, e.g., Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment, supra note 40, at 603 (“Cultural
relativism should not impede the establishment of a system-wide norm that holds accountable those
individuals who perpetrate acts of great wickedness. There is no culture that views the infliction of such
acts as tolerable.”)
43
Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide, supra note 40, at 1265; see also Drumbl, Collective Violence and
Individual Punishment, supra note 40, at 548-49, 610 (“[A]t a minimum, some space should be retained in
this accountability process for alternative (and perhaps competing) mechanisms, such as those that draw
from local custom, national practices, or indigenous legal process. . . . I propose . . . that international
criminal law and punishment contemplate communitarian underpinnings, in which international norms
40
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subtext of cultural relativism is present, and should be recognized, in this and other
debates about the relative value of international versus domestic responses to war crimes.
3. Cultural Relativism Within International War Crimes Prosecutions
As this discussion illustrates, the response to war crimes that reflects the most
“universalist” approach is that of an international war crimes tribunal such as the ICTY or
ICTR. Nonetheless, even given a decision to address war crimes through the use of an
international prosecutorial body, there may still be room for cultural sensitivity in how
that body goes about doing justice.
Of course, one could argue that the philosophy underlying international war
crimes prosecutions is diametrically opposed to the idea of cultural relativism. For
example, Justice Richard Goldstone, the former Chief Prosecutor for the ICTY and
ICTR, has called cultural relativism “a dangerous trend” and has argued that it should
play no role in war crimes prosecutions.44 Indeed, we would be appalled if an
international war crimes tribunal judged the architect of a genocide in Africa differently
from the architect of a genocide in Europe on the basis that the African defendant’s
actions reflected a part of his “culture” with which the international community should
not interfere.
Yet at the same time, culture – and cultural differences – have been and will
continue to be an undeniable fact of life for all parties involved with international
tribunals. International tribunals typically consist of legal officers (judges, prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and staff) who come from different cultures than the defendant and/or

become sedimentarily integrated into communities in a manner that takes into account cultural needs
instead of imposing cultural values.”)
44
Justice Richard Goldstone, Symposium: Prosecuting International Crimes: An Inside View, 7
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 11 (1997).
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victims.45 As Judge Patricia Wald has noted with respect to the ICTY, “[The ICTY] tries
suspects in a country to which they have no ties and sentences them to prison in other
foreign countries. To many internationalists this may reflect a triumph, but there are also
voices urging caution. . . . Our judicial systems, with their peculiar rights and remedies,
are products and reflections of our unique political and cultural notions.”46 If
international legal officers refuse to acknowledge this reality, and instead simply judge
the witnesses, facts, and defendant’s behavior solely based on their own cultural norms, it
is less likely that justice will result. We would therefore want these judges to
acknowledge and consider cultural differences as they proceed.
Thus one could accept the universal validity and application of certain war
crimes, but nonetheless see a role for cultural sensitivity in how an international war
crimes tribunal operates. To return to Professor Donnelly’s thesis, cultural relativism
arguments can apply to either the substance of human rights, the interpretation of
particular rights, and/or the form in which those rights are implemented.47 One could, for
example, advocate a universalist position with respect to a substantive list of human
rights (e.g., protection against genocide), but also allow culture-based deviations from
international norms at the level of interpretation (e.g., how genocide is defined in a
particular situation) or at the level of form and implementation (e.g., how a tribunal goes
about investigating and prosecuting an alleged genocide).
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III. Cultural Relativism and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
With these general observations in mind, it will be helpful at this point to apply
them to a specific case study. The ICTR is an ideal subject for this study, because several
aspects of the cultural relativism debate have resonated throughout the Rwandan
experience. Moreover, the Tribunal has considered cultural differences in the course of
fulfilling its mandate, thus illustrating the importance of these issues even when operating
within an universalist framework.
A. History of the Rwandan Genocide and the Establishment of the ICTR
1. Rwandan History Through 1994
The history leading up to the Rwandan genocide is well documented elsewhere.48
However, a brief recitation of the relevant facts here – with special emphasis on the role
that the international community played in these events – will assist us in evaluating the
relevance of cultural relativism to the establishment and work of the ICTR.
On April 6, 1994, the Rwandan President, Juvénal Habyarimana, was killed when
his plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile.49 This incident sparked the
widespread and systematic murder of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 civilians – mostly
Tutsis – throughout the country.50 When the violence subsided, more than 75% of
Rwandan’s ethnic Tutsi population had been slaughtered.51 The scale of the violence was
unprecedented: the murders occurred at almost three times the rate of the killing of Jews
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See generally, e.g., GOUREVITCH, supra note 1; GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDAN CRISIS: HISTORY OF A
GENOCIDE (1995); 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 29, at 47.
49
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during the Holocaust.52 Yet this genocide was not a spontaneous uprising, nor the
inevitable result of ancient tribal warfare. It was carefully planned, and, most agree, fully
preventable by the international community.53
Rwanda is composed primarily of two “ethnic” groups: the Hutu majority and the
Tutsi minority.54 Yet these two groups historically “spoke the same language, followed
the same religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled, without territorial distinctions . . .
sharing the same social and political culture in small chiefdoms.”55 In fact, because of
the great degree of intermixing throughout the years, ethnographers and historians
question whether the Tutsi and Hutu are in fact distinct ethnic groups.56 Rather, the main
historic distinction between the two groups was economic: “Hutus were cultivators and
Tutsis were herdsmen.”57 Because being a herdsman was a more prosperous vocation,
the minority Tutsi eventually emerged as an aristocratic elite; however, the lines between
the two groups remained porous.58
Nevertheless, when European colonizers arrived in Rwanda at the end of the
nineteenth century, they quickly seized on real or perceived differences between the two
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groups in order to further their own brand of “race science.”59 As Phillip Gourevitch
describes it in his history of the Rwandan genocide:
[W]hen the Europeans arrived in Rwanda at the end of the
nineteenth century, they formed a picture of a stately race
of warrior kings, surrounded by herds of long-horned cattle
and a subordinate race of short, dark peasants, hoeing
tubers and picking bananas. The white men assumed that
this was the tradition of the place, and they thought it a
natural arrangement.60
Thus to conform reality to their vision of it, the colonizers encouraged and deepened the
divide between the two groups. The Germans and then the Belgians set up a policy of
indirect colonial rule, with the Tutsis serving as feudal lords on the Europeans’ behalf.61
The Belgians also furthered the division of Hutu and Tutsi by “conduct[ing] a census for
the purpose of issuing identity cards which labeled every Rwandan as a Hutu, a Tutsi, or
a Twa.”62 A person’s classification was based on patrilineal lineage, and membership in
a particular group became increasingly rigid.63
Naturally, the majority Hutu population resented the assumption of Tutsi
superiority and the imposition of Tutsi rule by the Europeans.64 After World War II, as
independence movements spread throughout Africa, the Belgians began to sympathize
with the Hutus desire for self-determination.65 The Hutus therefore seized power in
Rwanda in 1959,66 and the first wave of systematic political violence between Hutus and
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Tutsis followed. During the next few years, over 100,000 Tutsis fled the country in the
face of mass killings.67
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda was a dictatorship ruled by the Frenchsupported President Habyarimana, and France brought the country within its “neocolonial
sphere in Francophone Africa.”68 During this same time period, the exiled Tutsis
attempted several times to invade Rwanda and overthrow the government. After each
unsuccessful attempt, Tutsis in Rwanda would be massacred by the thousands.69
In 1990, the largely Tutsi refugee army known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) attacked again, and France responded by sending arms to Rwanda and providing a
contingent of troops to fight with the Rwandan army.70 In late 1992, the fighting between
the Rwandan army and the RPF forces reached a stalemate, and the two camps began
negotiating a series of agreements that culminated in the August 1993 Arusha peace
accords.71 “[C]rucially, throughout the peace-implementation period a United Nations
peacekeeping force would be deployed in Rwanda.”72
Hutu extremists, many of whom were close to President Habyarimana, were
strongly opposed to the peace agreement, even as Hutu moderate opposition parties
gained increasing support among the Rwandan population.73 To shore up his support
among the Hutus, President Habyarimana soon sought to again unite them against “a
67
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common enemy”: the Tutsis.74 In 1993, a training camp for the “Hutu militia” was
established, providing groups of 300 Hutus at a time with courses “on methods of mass
murder and indoctrination in ethnic hatred.”75 The Rwandan authorities distributed six
million dollars worth of firearms provided by France to militia members and other
Habyarimana supporters; in addition, “machetes were imported en masse from China and
stored in secret caches throughout the country.”76
In early 1994, the commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Rwanda
(UNAMIR), Major General Romeo Dallaire, sent a cable to the U.N. Headquarters
warning that the Hutu hard-liners were planning a genocidal massacre of the Tutsis.77 In
the weeks following, he made repeated requests for reinforcements and sought
authorization to use force to seize the weapons caches, but U.N. officials – still stinging
from the death of U.S. soldiers in peacekeeping operations in Somalia – refused these
requests.78
This set the stage for the mass genocide that began in April 1994. Almost
instantly after Habyarimana was assassinated, Hutu soldiers and the newly trained militia
began to hunt down and kill Tutsi civilians and moderate Hutus.79 Barricades were
erected on major thoroughfares, at which members of the Hutu Presidential Guard
inspected identity cards and executed those who had a Tutsi identity card or were
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perceived to have Tutsi Physical traits.80 Tutsis were hunted down and killed through
house-to-house searches, and Tutsis who sought refuge at churches or hotels were often
surrounded by soldiers and massacred.81 Hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were
murdered, and tens of thousands of Tutsi women were raped and/or sexually mutilated.82
In the meantime, Belgium withdrew from the U.N. Peacekeeping force after a
contingent of ten Belgian United Nations Peacekeepers were captured, tortured, and
murdered.83 On April 21, 1994, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution that
ordered the retreat of all but 270 U.N. Peacekeeping troops.84 The United States not only
sought to avoid involvement with peacekeeping missions but also urged others not to
undertake missions that it wished to avoid.85 When other countries began pushing for the
return of U.N. troops, the United States demanded control of the mission and then
encouraged delays in the deployment of troops on the Security Council.86
At the same time, French diplomats were depicting the massacre as a “mass
popular outrage” in response to the President’s assassination.87 France also encouraged
the view that that the killing was an extension of the war with the RPF, and that the RPF
was either the greater offender, or that at most a two-way genocide was taking place: “in
short, that Rwandans were simply killing each other as they were wont to do, for
primordial tribal reasons, since time immemorial.”88 France also launched Operation
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Tourquoise, which the Security Counsel endorsed and gave permission to use force.89
(By a strange coincidence, the Rwandan government occupied a rotating seat on the
Security Council at this time.90) Operation Turquoise set up a “safe zone” in
southwestern Rwanda, but many asked “safe for whom?”91 The operation did rescue at
least 10,000 Tutsis, but thousands more were killed in the zone under France’s control.92
The Hutu government even moved its radio station into the French zone and continued to
broadcast incitements to kill Tutsis.93
Nevertheless, by mid-July, the RPF had pushed its way to the capital, and
hundreds of thousands of Hutus had fled into Southwest Rwanda and Zaire (now the
Democratic Republic of the Congo).94 On July 18, the Hutu extremist government fled
the country and the RPF established a new coalition government with the surviving
members of the anti-Hutu Power opposition parties.95 Thus the genocide ended, but
Rwanda was left with hundreds of thousands dead and wounded, and hundreds of
thousands of murderers and accomplices.
2. After the Genocide: The International Community’s Response
The international community had failed to prevent or stop the genocide, but it
nevertheless quickly turned to the question of what it might do to help bring the
perpetrators to justice.96 The Rwandan penal system had been completely decimated,97
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and the new government – which now occupied the Rwandan seat on the Security
Council – began pressing for a war crimes tribunal similar to the ICTY, set up the
pervious year.98
However, many on the Security Council were resistant to the idea of a “costly
international investigation and a tribunal which the United Nations could ill-afford.”99
Such resistance was harshly criticized, and some suggested that it smacked of racism.100
As one commentator noted:
[H]ad the sequence of events between the Yugoslav and
Rwanda conflicts been different, it is by no means certain
that a tribunal for Rwanda would have been established. On
the basis of international responses to other situations, it
has been suggested that the plight of African victims would
not generate the same outcry as the suffering of Europeans.
In other words, the Rwanda Tribunal was established [only]
because of the precedential effect of the Yugoslav
Tribunal.101
Or as the Prime Minister-delegate of the new Rwandan coalition government asked,
“Was a war crimes court not set up in Germany? Is it because we’re Africans that a court
has not been set up [for Rwanda]?”102
Thus in November 1994 the Security Council established the ICTR.103 In a
strange turn of events, however, Rwanda was the only member of the Security Council to
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vote against the Resolution that created the Tribunal.104 Although it had initially
requested its creation, as negotiations progressed Rwanda objected to a number of the
provisions in the Tribunal’s governing statute.105 First, Rwanda objected because the
ICTR would have jurisdiction only over crimes committed during the 1994 calendar
year,106 which would prevent the ICTR from fully investigating the activities that led up
to the genocide.107 Second, Rwanda objected that the ICTR would be understaffed and
underfunded, with only a handful of judges and with the appellate body and chief
prosecutor to be split between the ICTR and the ICTY.108 Third, Rwanda objected to the
fact that the seat of the court would be in Tanzania rather than Rwanda, which would
make it more difficult for the Rwandan people to follow the court’s proceedings.109
Finally, Rwanda objected to the fact that the Tribunal’s statute prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty.110 This objection was tied to the fact that the ICTR was
never expected to try more than a handful of defendants, and that it would focus on the
regime elites who had the greatest role in organizing and executing and the genocidal
plan.111 Because the Rwandan Penal Code does provide for the death penalty, “[t]hose
most responsible for the killings” would not face the death penalty, while lower-level
perpetrators tried in the Rwandan courts might be executed.112 Similarly, Rwanda argued
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that the prison terms for those convicted at the Tribunal should be served in Rwanda, “not
in some posh facility in Europe.”113
These specific disputes also reflected Rwanda’s broader frustration with the
international community. Many felt that Rwanda needed international assistance to fit its
unique situation, but instead the international community applied a “cookie-cutter”
approach by establishing a tribunal that was “essentially a weaker, more impoverished
replica” of the ICTY.114 Moreover, whereas at the time of the establishment of the ICTY
there was little reason to expect serious local prosecutions of war crimes perpetrators, the
situation with Rwanda was different: “local authorities were willing to prosecute and
could have used extensive international assistance to make such efforts more credible.”115
Instead, international resources that could have gone to rebuild the shattered Rwandan
justice system were diverted to the ICTR.116 Thus some have argued that the existence of
the ICTR is more a reflection of “internationalist priorities” than a genuine response to
the needs of the Rwandan victims.117
B. Cultural Relativism and the Rwandan Experience
This history – both of the Rwandan genocide and of the establishment of the
ICTR – illustrates several of the issues in the universalist/cultural relativist debate
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discussed supra. In fact, both universalists and cultural relativists can find support for
their positions in these facts.
1. The Universalist Response
First, a universalist could point out that certain real or perceived elements of
Rwandan “culture” appear to have contributed to the genocide. For example, Rwandans
and non-Rwandans alike often speak of the “culture of impunity” that prevailed prior to
1994.118 Although this is more in the nature of rhetoric – meaning simply that
perpetrators of previous abuses had gone unpunished – than an assertion of an actual
“cultural” value, the use of the word is nonetheless telling. Moreover, there does in fact
appear to have been a cultural norm that encouraged inter-ethnic violence in Rwanda,
especially when that violence was orchestrated and ordered by community leaders.119
This aspect of Rwandan society is sometimes referred to as a “culture of obedience”:120
[T]here had always been a strong tradition of unquestioning
obedience to authority in the pre-colonial kingdom of
Rwanda. This tradition was of course reinforced by both
the German and the Belgian colonial administrations. And
since independence the country has lived under a wellorganized tightly-controlled state. When the highest
authorities in that state told you to do something you did it,
even if it included killing.121
To the extent that these can be considered “cultural” values or traits, a universalist
approach would argue – correctly – that these traits are not worthy of protection.
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In addition, as illustrated by the history of Rwanda discussed supra, Rwanda is an
example of “disruptive and incomplete westernization [and] cultural confusion,” and thus
cultural relativism arguments have less force when applied to modern Rwandan
culture.122 Indeed, the supposedly ancient “tribal” conflicts between Hutu and Tutsi in
Rwanda are directly rooted in the legacy of colonialism, and until “1959 there had never
been systematic political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis – anywhere.”123
As one scholar has pointed out, the “simplistic ‘tribal war thesis’ is often a reflection of
ethnocentrism, if not an expedient absolution from apathy in the face of immense human
suffering.”124 This version of “ethnocentrism” thus reflects one aspect of the “negative
face” of cultural relativism – the outsider dismissing human rights abuses on the grounds
that “that’s just their culture, so there’s nothing that we can do about it.”
Similarly, with respect to the establishment of the ICTR, the universalism
argument directs our attention to the admonitions by Rwandans and others that genocide
in African is just as worthy of international adjudication as is genocide in Europe.
Indeed, we must avoid cultural relativism arguments in cases where such arguments are
nothing more than a way for the international community - particularly the West - to
avoid responding to horrors that take place in cultures that do not more closely resemble
our own.
2. The Cultural Relativist Response
However, the history of Rwanda and the establishment of the ICTR provides
support for cultural relativism arguments as well. Cultural relativism is – at least in part
those who commit extraordinary international crimes are the ones conforming to social norms whereas
those who refuse to commit the crimes choose to act deviantly.”)
122
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– a response to colonialism and the harm that comes from outside (particularly
“Western”) influences in another culture. Given the fact that the Tutsi/Hutu distinction
and ultimate conflict was largely furthered through Western influence - based on thencurrent notions of race and ethnicity - Rwanda would be justified in resisting further
impositions of Western values, even if those values are now couched in terms of
assistance rather than conquest. Moreover, given the failure of the international
community to prevent or stop the genocide, as well as the cooperation of some Western
states with the regime that perpetrated the genocide, Rwanda would be correct to greet
any new offer of Western help with skepticism.
In addition, elements of moral imperialism (the “negative face” of universalism)
can be found in the Security Council’s decision to create the ICTR in spite of the
objections by the post-genocide Rwandan government. This decision may reflect the
perception “that the Rwandan judiciary was incapable of reaching just verdicts,” and that
“any trials that Rwanda might hold [would be] beneath international standards.”125 This
perception is furthered by the fact that the ICTR has “primary” jurisdiction in any case
that fits under its mandate, meaning that it may require Rwandan (or other) domestic
courts to relinquish any defendant falling under its mandate to its jurisdiction.126 While
this does not necessarily reflect insensitivity to specific Rwandan cultural values, it does
imply that the international community is a better judge of Rwandan events than are
Rwandans. This is (1) questionable, in light of the international community’s actions
leading up to and during the genocide; and (2) dangerous, as it may encourage the
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perception of Rwanda as lawless, tribal, or primitive (a perception that universalists
would also seek to avoid).
C. The Role of Culture in ICTR Trials and Decisions
Thus by looking at Rwanda through the lens of the universalist/cultural relativist
debate, we can see that there are truths – and dangers – in both lines of thought. I next
turn to the question of what role, if any, cultural sensitivity does or should play in the
operation of the Tribunal. As demonstrated by several cases issued by the Tribunal, I
believe that it has appropriately adopted a “mild” cultural relativist approach in its
operations, and that it has endeavored, where appropriate, to recognize and take into
account differences in the Rwandan culture when recognition of those differences has
assisted the Tribunal to do justice.
1. Cultural and Language Factors Affecting Witness Testimony
Several ICTR decisions have noted the difficulty of receiving and interpreting
testimony from witnesses whose culture and language is foreign to the Tribunal Judges’
own. The first case to discuss this issue was The Prosecutor v. Akayesu, in which the
Trial Chamber found the former Bourgmestre (mayor) of Taba guilty of genocide, direct
and public incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity, and sentenced
him to life in prison.127
In assessing the evidence against Mr. Akayesu, the Trial Chamber specifically
considered “cultural factors which might affect an understanding of the evidence
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presented.”128 Some of these difficulties stemmed from the fact that most of the
witnesses spoke Kinyarwanda. For example, the Trial Chamber noted that there appeared
to be contradictions between the testimony of several witnesses on the stand and earlier
statements by these same witnesses given to Tribunal investigators.129 The Trial
Chamber explained these inconsistencies, in part, by noting that “the interpretation of oral
testimony of witnesses from Kinyarwanda into one of the official languages of the
tribunal [French and English] has been a particularly great challenge due to the fact that
the syntax and everyday modes of expression in the Kinyarwanda language are complex
and difficult to translate into French or English.”130 These difficulties, the Tribunal
reasoned, affected the pre-trial interviews as well as the interpretation of in-court
testimony.131
The Trial Chamber also noted that certain Kinyarwanda terms were infused with
special meaning that could only be understood within the context of the Rwandan culture.
For example, the basic meaning of the term Inyenzi is “cockroach.”132 However, the term
had also been used to refer to the incursions of Tutsi refugees since the 1960s,133 and it
was later used by anti-Tutsi extremist media to refer to all Tutsis.134 Similarly, the term
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Ibyitso, which literally means “accomplice,” evolved in the early 1990s to refer to all
Tutsi.135
Moreover, taking such linguistic nuances into account may be relatively simple
compared to the additional, broader “cultural factors” that the Tribunal found were also
affecting witness testimony.136 For example, the Tribunal received expert testimony that
“most Rwandans live in an oral tradition in which facts are reported as they are perceived
by the witness, often irrespective of whether the facts were personally witnessed or
recounted by someone else.”137 Thus during the examination of certain witnesses, it was
“at times clarified that evidence which had been reported as an eyewitness account was in
fact a second-hand account of what was witnessed.”138 The expert witness explained that
this was common in the Rwandan culture, but also that “the Rwandan community was
like any other and that a clear distinction could be articulated by the witnesses between
what they had heard and what they had seen.”139 The Trial Chamber therefore “made a
consistent effort to ensure that this distinction was drawn throughout the trial
proceedings.”140
Moreover, the Tribunal also received expert testimony that “it is a particular
feature of the Rwandan culture that people are not always direct in answering questions,
especially if the question is delicate. In such cases, the answers given will very often
have to be ‘decoded’ in order to be understood correctly. This interpretation will rely on
the context, the particular speech community, the identity of and the relation between the
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orator and the listener, and the subject matter of the question.”141 The Trial Chamber
noted specific instances of this in the proceedings: for example, several witnesses were
reluctant or unwilling to state that the ordinary meaning of the term Inyenzi was
cockroach, although all Rwandans know the meaning of the word.142 More generally, the
Trial Chamber also attributed to “cultural constraints” the “difficulty [of some witnesses]
to be specific as to dates, times, distances and locations.”143
In light of these observations, the “Chamber did not draw any adverse conclusions
regarding the credibility of witnesses based only on their reticence and their sometimes
circuitous responses to questions.”144 This is significant, as it acknowledges that in many
cultures such “reticence” or “circuitous” testimony would affect a witness’s credibility.
Indeed, the Judges’ inclusion of this discussion in the opinion reflects the fact that the
Judges themselves would – in their home countries – likely have drawn a negative
inference about these witnesses’ credibility.145 However, in this case, an insistence on the
type of directness that the Judges would normally associate with truthfulness might have
led them to discount truthful testimony and reach an unjust result. The Judges therefore
correctly recognized that they must consider the cultural differences between themselves
and the witnesses before them in adjudicating the case.
Similarly, in The Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber found Georges
Rutaganda, second vice-president of the youth wing of the Interahamwe - the youth
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militia responsible for many of the killings - guilty of genocide and crimes against
humanity and sentenced him to life in prison.146 The Trial Chamber noted that it had:
taken into consideration various social and cultural factors
in assessing the testimony of some of the witnesses. Some
of these witnesses were farmers and people who did not
have a high standard of education, and they had difficulty
in identifying and testifying to some of the exhibits, such as
photographs of various locations, maps etc. These
witnesses also experienced difficulty in testifying as to
dates, times, distances, colours and motor vehicles.147
The Trial Chamber also noted “that many of the witnesses testified in Kinyarwanda and
as such their testimonies were simultaneously translated into French and English. As a
result, the essence of the witnesses’ testimonies was at times lost.”148
On appeal,149 Rutaganda argued that the Trial Chamber committed an error of law
“by improperly taking judicial notice of social and cultural factors.”150 Rutaganda argued
that “social and cultural factors are not ‘matters of common knowledge’ in respect of
which judicial notice should be taken” under the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
and that the Judges “made generalizations that were not corroborated by evidence or,
especially, by expert opinion.”151 Thus, the defendant argued, “facts that were noted as
being matters of common knowledge were in reality only matters of personal knowledge
and stereotypes that the various members of the Trial Chamber may have had on the
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Rwandan people.”152 Rutaganda also criticized the Trial Chamber for applying the
factors in a general way, without indicating the specific witnesses to which they
applied.153
The Appeals Chamber rejected the defendant’s argument. It held that the steps
taken by the Trial Chamber could not be properly characterized as “judicial notice, the
underlying purpose of which is to dispense with future proof of officially recorded facts
that are indisputable.”154 Instead, the Appeals Chamber reasoned that “the Trial
Judgment only states an observation that obviously dawned on the Trial Chamber as it
heard the evidence given before it, namely, the fact that some of the persons heard were
farmers and people who were not sufficiently literate, and that this situation had
repercussions on the quality of their evidence . . . .”155
The Appeals Chamber also rejected the contention that the Trial Chamber
improperly took a general approach rather than indicating “in which cases and to what
extent, in its assessment, it applied the test based on the impact of socio or cultural
factors.”156 The Appeals Chamber concluded that the Trial Chamber acted properly in
setting out an introductory observation, and that it was not required to “articulate every
step of its reasoning for each particular finding it makes.”157 The Appeals Chamber also
reasoned that the Trial Chamber had provided some specificity about the witnesses to
whom its general observation applied, i.e., “farmers and people who did not have a high
standard of education.”158
152
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The Appeals Chamber then used the Example of Witness A, who “was born in a
rural prefecture and lived in Rwanda all his life, spoke only Kinyarwanda, and was a
mason by profession.”159 When asked to estimate a distance in kilometers, the witness
instead gave a distance based on his own visual assessment.160 The witness also had
difficulty giving directions in terms of north/south designations.161 The Appeals
Chamber concluded that these difficulties “must be taken into account,” but that they “do
not affect the testimony as a whole or its credibility.”162
Thus, once again the Tribunal refused to hold the witnesses to a “universal”
standard of credibility – i.e., a standard that would conform more to the Judge’s own
cultural expectations. However, although the Trial Chamber probably should not be
required to name each instance in which it considered cultural factors in evaluating
testimony, it would nonetheless be better if the Trial Chamber did so in most cases. Only
then can the Appellate division, the defendants, the larger Rwandan community, and the
international legal community truly evaluate whether these were appropriate exercises in
cultural sensitivity, or whether at times the Tribunal may have seen “cultural” differences
where they did not exist.
Specifically, Rwandans have an interest in ensuring that the Tribunal does not
characterize any cultural differences in such a way that they are perceived as inferiorities.
For example, it is unclear whether the lack of a witnesses ability to give directions in
north-south designations is truly due to “cultural differences” (e.g., this mode of direction
159
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is not used in some segments of Rwandan society) or was due to the fact that a particular
individual was not educated. In fact, the Appeals Chamber appears to favor the later
explanation, while also giving lip service to the notion of true “cultural” differences that
can affect witness testimony.
Thus the Trial Chamber should endeavor in the future to be more specific about
the particular witnesses to whom it applies these standards, and in relation to which part
of their testimony. Nevertheless, the ICTR should be commended for recognizing the
cultural issues that are raised by its work, rather than taking a radical universalist
approach that could have interfered with its ability to do justice.
2. Genocide and the Definition of “Ethnicity”
Cultural differences may also affect the application of international legal concepts
to specific fact situations. For example, the Akayesu decision reflected the first time that
an international court found an individual guilty of genocide, but this was not a foregone
conclusion as a matter of law. Article 2(2) of the ICTR’s statute reflects, verbatim, the
definition of genocide as contained in the Genocide Convention.163 Genocide “means
any of [a series of] acts . . . committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such,” including, inter alia, “killing
members of the group [or] causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group.”164 The Trial Chamber found as fact that the defendant engaged in these acts with
the intent to destroy the Tutsi.165 Yet as described supra, it is debatable whether the
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Tutsis constituted a separate group, ethnic, racial, or otherwise, at the time of the
massacre.166
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber recognized that “in the context of the period in
question,” the Tutsi and Hutu “were, in consonance with a distinction made by the
colonizers, considered both by the authorities and themselves as belonging to two distinct
ethnic groups . . . .”167 The Trial Chamber also noted that “in a patrilineal society like
Rwanda, the child belongs to the father’s group of origin,” and that pregnant Hutu
women were killed on the ground that Tutsi men fathered the fetuses they carried.168
Thus, because the victims were not chosen as individuals or because they were RPF
fighters, but rather due to their membership in the “Tutsi ethnic group,” the Trial
Chamber concluded that genocide was committed “against the Tutsi as a group.”169 The
Tribunal thereby adopted “a strikingly modern definition of an ethnic group that accepts
its constructed nature while acknowledging the power and potency of ethnic selfdetermination.”170
Similarly, in Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber stated that there were currently no
“internationally accepted precise definitions” of “the concepts of national, ethnical,
racial, and religious groups,” and that therefore “[e]ach of these concepts must be
assessed in light of a particular political, social and cultural context.”171 The Court also
held that, for purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership in a particular
group is a subjective concept – the victim either perceives him/herself as belonging to a
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group and/or the perpetrator perceives the victim as belonging to the group slated for
destruction.172 Thus the Trial Chamber held that “in assessing whether a particular group
may be considered as protected from the crime of genocide, [we] will proceed on a caseby-case basis, taking into account both the relevant evidence proffered and the political
and cultural context . . . .”173 The Trial Chamber also agreed with the Akayesu judgment
that although the Tutsi population does not have its own language or a culture distinct
from other Rwandans, “there were a number of objective indicators of the group as a
group with a distinct identity.”174 These included the identity cards that all Rwandans
were required to carry, Rwandan laws in force prior to 1994 that identified Rwandans by
reference to their ethnic group, and “customary rules . . . governing the determination of
ethnic group, which followed patrilineal lines.”175 Considering both these subjective and
objective factors, the Trial Chamber concluded that the “identification of persons as
belonging to the group of Hutu or Tutsi or Twa had thus become embedded in Rwandan
culture,” and concluded that the Tutsi qualified as a stable and permanent ethnic group
under the Genocide Convention.176
Thus in these cases the interpretation and implementation of a universal norm –
the prohibition against genocide – was informed and assisted by a consideration of the
specific cultural context in which a potential genocide occurred. Conceivably, the
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Tribunal could have adopted a rigid, radical universalist view that only “ethnic groups” as
defined by “objective” Western sociologists would meet the definition under the
Genocide Convention. Instead, the Tribunal correctly recognized the fluidity of culture
and context, and did justice to the real-world experience of the Rwandan Tutsis.177
3. Sentencing Practices
As discussed supra, the lack of a death penalty option at the ICTR was one reason
that the Rwandan government voted against the establishment of the Tribunal.
Nevertheless, there are other aspects of the ICTR sentencing structure that are more
sensitive to the Rwandan culture and judicial system. Specifically, Article 23 of the
ICTR Statute states that “[t]he penalty imposed by the Trial Chamber shall be limited to
imprisonment. In determining the terms of imprisonment, the Trial Chamber shall have
recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of Rwanda.”178
This again reflects a form of “mild” cultural relativism, in this instance built into
the ICTR Statute itself. Under this provision, two people – one in Rwanda and one in
Yugoslavia – could commit the exact same act with the exact same mens rea, and both be
found guilty of the same crime. However, if the sentencing practices in Rwanda (which
presumably reflect Rwandan cultural preferences) were harsher than those of
Yugoslavia,179 the Rwandan defendant could receive a harsher sentence for the same act.
perhaps correctly, that “[t]his is not what the ‘crime of crimes’ was supposed to look like [in the 1940s],”
he concedes that he is describing the initial Western ‘race science’ conception of the crime.
177
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This might be unfair to the individual defendant, but a contrary result would arguably
ignore the needs of Rwandan victims to see justice done in a way that accords with their
cultural expectations.
A specific example of the ICTR’s sentencing practice helps to illustrate the point.
In The Prosecutor v. Georges Ruggiu, the accused, a Belgian journalist who moved to
Rwanda and broadcast discriminatory and threatening remarks against the Tutsis and
others on Rwandan radio, pled guilty to incitement to commit genocide.180 In sentencing
Mr. Ruggiu, the Tribunal noted Article 23’s requirement that it take Rwandan sentencing
practices into account.181 Under Rwandan domestic law, perpetrators of genocide or
crimes against humanity are grouped into categories: Category 1 offenders are those who
were “among planners, organizers, supervisors and leaders” of the genocide, persons who
“acted in positions of authority,” or “[n]otorious murderers” who “distinguished
themselves” “by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed
atrocities.”182 Category 2 offenders are those whose acts “place them among the
perpetrators, conspirators or accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault
against the person causing death.”183 Under Rwandan law, the sentence for Persons
found guilty of Category 1 offensives is the mandatory death penalty, and for Persons in
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Category 2 it is life imprisonment.184 However, persons in Category 2 or below can have
their sentence reduced by entering a plea of guilty.185
The Tribunal concluded that Ruggiu would most likely fall under “Category
Two” in the Rwandan system. The Trial Chamber then noted that, under Rwandan law,
those who pled guilty after prosecution for a Category Two offense receive 12-15 years
in prison.186 The Tribunal also noted, however, that it was not required to conform to
Rwandan sentencing practice, but was merely obliged to “take account” of that
practice.187 “[W]hile the Chamber will refer as much as practicable to the sentencing
provisions under the [Rwandan] law, it will also exercise its unfettered discretion to
determine sentences.”188
In considering the appropriate sentence for Mr. Ruggiu, the Trial Chamber noted
that “[t]he accused is a European with a moderate level of education, who is inspired by a
sense of justice.”189 The Trial Chamber also stated that “[d]efense counsel submitted that
the accused was indoctrinated by a biased picture of the socio-political situation in
Rwanda. The Chamber takes into account that the accused was not sufficiently
knowledgeable to be able to make informed assessments of the situation. . . . [T]he
accused was a person of good character imbued with ideals before he became involved in
the events in Rwanda.”190 The Trial Chamber then sentenced Ruggiu to two 12-year
sentences, to be served concurrently.191
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The Trial Chamber was correct to conform Mr. Ruggiu’s sentence to Rwandan
sentencing practices. However, the Chamber’s references to Ruggiu’s European
background and seeming “corruption” by his visits to Rwanda are deeply troubling. This
language implies that the Chamber was more lenient with the defendant on the theory
that, as a European, Mr. Ruggiu is the product of a more “just” culture.192 If true, this
would be a gross mistake. Perhaps this is an example where one positive cultural
relativist notion (Rwandan victims deserve sentencing consistent with their own cultural
notions of justice) balanced a negative cultural relativist notion (Europeans are more
“just” and less violent than Rwandans) to arrive at a sentence that, though light, was at
least consistent with Rwanda’s own sentencing practices.193
IV.

Lessons for the Future
At first glance, there would appear to be little room for cultural relativism with

regard to war crimes. Indeed, in responding to a particular situation, international actors
– particularly those from the West – should never ignore or minimize these crimes simply
because they occurred in a culture dissimilar to our own. Thus claims for dissimilar
treatment in war crimes prosecution on the basis of culture should be treated with
caution, particularly with regards to Africa. The international community could easily
hide its own neglect, or regime elites could hide their abuses, behind a veil of cultural
sensitivity. Therefore, because the trend appears to be for the prosecution of war crimes
by international tribunals, these tribunals should apply to persons of all cultures equally.
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However, there is also room for caution. The establishment of the ICTR by the
U.N. Security Council probably went too far in embracing “universal” values at the
expense of the true needs of the Rwandan people. Specifically, certain aspects of the
Tribunal’s statute appeared to contradict Rwandan notions of justice. The absence of the
death penalty, for example, raised the specter of moral imperialism, especially in light of
the fact that those found guilty at Nuremberg were given the death penalty.194 More
generally, the establishment of the Tribunal over the opposition of the post-genocidal
government will do very little to further the rule of law in Rwanda or to assist in building
the capacity of the Rwandan judicial system.
As discussed supra, the ICTR has tried in its operations to strike a balance
between universalism and cultural relativism concerns. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has
not “made real contact with the populace[] affected by [its] proceedings. [It is] perceived
as distant and unconcerned with the effect of [its] activities upon victims.”195 The very
fact that the Tribunal is struggling with these difficulties should warn us against rushing
to establish international tribunals that will apply international law without prior input
from or knowledge about the affected culture. Judge Wald reached a similar conclusion
with respect to the ICTY:
My experience with the inner workings of an international
court suggests care. With careful self and public scrutiny,
such courts can responsibly perform important adjudication
and accountability functions that national courts in the
thrall of leaders who are themselves alleged war criminals
194
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cannot. However, they should be reserved for just such
extreme situations.196
At the time the Tribunal was established, Rwanda was no longer “in the thrall” of
its previous genocidal government. Of course, Rwanda did need international assistance,
and badly. Moreover, the presence of international judges and other legal personnel can
have a beneficial effect on war crimes prosecutions. For example, “the presence of
international judges can help to (a) educate local judges on international law and minimal
standards of fairness, (b) create an impression of impartiality, and (c) insulate local
judges to some degree against intimidation from their own governments.”197 Thus
international involvement in these situations can be useful and should not be completely
rejected. Nonetheless, in the case of the ICTR, it would have been better to seek a
compromise such that the Tribunal would have involved more participation by Rwandans
and better consideration of Rwandan needs.
Hybrid courts, or courts which have aspects of both international and national
courts, likely reflect the best balance between universalism and cultural relativism
concerns in this respect.198 Hybrid models have several advantages over “pure”
international models: they are generally cheaper to establish and operate, and – key to the
cultural relativism debate – they are “considered to be politically less divisive, more
meaningful to victim populations, and more effective at rebuilding local justice
systems.”199 In addition, because hybrid courts typically consist of both domestic and
foreign judges, local judges may be able to explain relevant cultural norms to their
196
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international colleagues, thus lessening the need for costly and time consuming expert
witness testimony and decreasing the chance of error in interpreting cultural norms.
For example, the hybrid “Special Court” for Sierra Leone is prosecuting those
who allegedly committed war crimes in that country’s civil war.200 The Sierra Leone
Tribunal differs from the ICTR model in several respects: (1) it is based on a treaty
between the United Nations and Sierra Leone, as opposed to the ICTY and ICTR which
were established pursuant to the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers; (2) the Special
Court has the ability to consider not only violations of international humanitarian law, but
also certain crimes under Sierra Leonean domestic law; (3) while it has primacy over
domestic prosecutions in Sierra Leone, it lacks primacy over national courts of third party
states; and (4) most importantly for our purposes, “unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which are
composed exclusively of international judges elected by the U.N. General Assembly and
a Prosecutor selected by the Security Council, the Special Court is . . . composed of both
international and Sierra Leonean judges, prosecutors, and staff . . . .”201
More specifically, of the three judges who sit in each trial chamber of the Special
Court, one is appointed by Sierra Leone and two are appointed by the U.N. Secretary
General, and of the five judges who serve in the Appeals chamber, two are appointed by
the Government of Sierra Leone and three by the Secretary-General.202 The Sierra Leone
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government can, but is not required to, appoint judges from Sierra Leone.203 The
Secretary General also appoints the Prosecutor for a four-year term,204 who shall be
independent from any government, but the Deputy Prosecutor must be a Sierra
Leonean.205 The Prosecutor may also have other Sierra Leonean or international staff.206
Thus the Special Court is more inclusive than the ICTR in several respects, thereby
recognizing the value of participation by those most affected by the crimes under its
jurisdiction.
Another advantage of the Special Court is the fact that it is located in Sierra
Leone.207 There are significant advantages to having the court “on site”: it gives the
Court better and timelier access to witnesses and evidence, makes site visits possible
without long delays in the trials, and may make victims and witnesses more comfortable
when testifying.208 It can also help strengthen the legal system in Sierra Leone, by giving
the government significant involvement in the establishment and administration of the
court, as well as by leaving behind the actual physical structure of the Court – no small
matter in one of the poorest countries in the world.209 In addition, it will give the local
population greater access to the court’s proceedings, and allow local journalists to
provide current updates in native languages.210
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Of course, a purely international tribunal could also be located within the country
where the crimes occurred, so this is not an inherent advantage of hybrid courts over the
ICTY/ICTR model. Nonetheless, the location of a court in the country of origin reflects
an important improvement in terms of the universalism/cultural relativism debate: it
allows the local population to accept the court as part of the local culture, and it helps to
lessen the perception of outsider justice and moral imperialism while still involving the
international community in the process. The inclusion of domestic crimes within the
court’s mandate should also be an advantage in this respect, as these laws may reflect
local culture more directly and fully than do purely international norms.
Of course, hybrid courts are not a panacea for all of the problems inherent in war
crimes prosecutions. Because of the participation of international judges, hybrid courts
will inevitably have the same language and translation difficulties that plague any
international tribunal.211 In addition, since hybrid courts are more likely to apply a
mixture of international and national law, they will need to interpret domestic law
correctly – a task with which the ICTR has apparently had some difficulty.212 Of course,
the risk of error should be lessened by the presence of at least some judges from the
affected country on the court, but these judges may have to take extra care monitoring the
work of their international colleagues.
It could also be argued that the inclusion of local judges on hybrid courts will
make the proceedings more biased (either in favor of or against the defendants) and thus
less likely to achieve legitimacy with the local or international communities.213 Or put in
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the context of the cultural relativism debate, the inclusion of local judges could further
(or be perceived as furthering) negative aspects of the local culture. This argument might
have extra force where, as in Rwanda, local judges would almost inevitably be a member
of one of the disputing racial or ethnic groups. However, this problem would also be
inherent in any domestic tribunal, and thus the presence of international judges on hybrid
courts should reduce any perceived or real bias. Perhaps this is also a good reason to
have a majority of the judges come from or be appointed by third countries, as is the case
with the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Hybrid courts have also suffered from funding difficulties – for example, the
Sierra Leone Special Court was to be funded by voluntary contributions, a problematic
approach that can lead to serious budget shortfalls.214 However, this is not a problem
inherent in the hybrid system, and the ICTR and ICTY have also had funding struggles.
Rather, it reflects that fact that any court, in order to be successful, must be given the
resources it needs to fulfill its mandate. The funding problem does, however, reflect the
fact that more needs to be done to convince the international community of the
advantages of the hybrid system. Although it may not look as inherently “international”
as some tribunals (and thus the international community may be more tempted to say “it’s
not our concern”) – in reality the hybrid model reflects a wise compromise between the
international and domestic systems, and is probably a better way for the international
community to spend its money.
The existence of the International Criminal Court does not moot the issue.
Although the ICC will undoubtedly be an important factor in war crimes prosecutions,
due to various factors (especially the resistance of the United States to the court) it
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appears unlikely that it will become the sole international body to prosecute war crimes in
the foreseeable future.215 Thus hybrid tribunals may have an important role to play, and
should be considered in any instance where the ICC can not or does not assume
jurisdiction over international crimes.
Nevertheless, the ICC will likely be a major force in the future of war crimes
punishments, and it should be aware of universalism/cultural relativism issues as it
pursues its mandate. As a “pure” international court, the ICC may inherently tilt too far
toward radical universalism ideas, as with the ICTR.216 However, because it is a treaty
body, at some point the affected local government (or the government of the defendant)
will have agreed to its jurisdiction, thus hopefully representing some consent by the local
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culture.217 In addition, unlike the ICTR, which can require any national court to
relinquish jurisdiction over a defendant under its mandate,218 the Rome Statute provides
that cases will be admissible only if national justice systems are “unwilling or unable
genuinely” to investigate or prosecute.219 In terms of the universalism/cultural relativism
debate, this is an improvement, and should allow the court to avoid many of the pitfalls
that other international tribunals have encountered. Most importantly, it gives the
country affected the chance to implement justice according to local customs and norms,
yet it still gives the ICC the opportunity to assume jurisdiction if the local efforts are
nonexistent or merely sham proceedings.
Finally, the ICC can strike the proper balance between universalism and cultural
relativism concerns by “working with local governments to get their systems in shape
rather than merely fighting off their efforts to resist ICC jurisdiction.”220 The ICC can
also work in conjunction with hybrid tribunals: at least one scholar has proposed the
establishment of joint initiatives between the ICC and national or hybid courts.221
Finally, where it does assume jurisdiction, the ICC can and should follow the lead of the
ICTR in recognizing and taking into account cultural differences when they arise.
V.

Conclusion
In conclusion, judges and others involved in international war crimes prosecutions

must be aware of the dangers of both radical universalism and radical cultural relativism.
They should attempt to strike a balance that will recognize legitimate cultural differences
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– particularly when those differences may make it more difficult to uncover the truth
about what occurred – but without ignoring the danger of using cultural relativism as a
shield behind which to hide atrocities. A “mild” cultural relativism approach is the best
way to accomplish these goals. This approach applauds the involvement of the
international community in war crimes prosecutions, regardless of the identity of the
victims. However, this approach also recognizes the value of the cultural sensitivity and
encourages the international community to understand and work with the culture of those
whom it seeks to judge. The best balance can be struck by establishing hybrid tribunals
and/or by international tribunals exercising jurisdiction only where the domestic courts
are unable or unwilling to do so. By following this approach, the international
community can further the cause of universal justice without alienating the very people it
is designed to serve.
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